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THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES.
Perhaps with Professor Gray, we may say that the law aims
to forward the circulation of property' and that it adopts two
means of doing so. One of these means is the so-called rule
against Perpetuities, the other is the disallowance of restraints
upon alienation. He narrates that when he began to collect
the authorities on perpetuities, he did not clearly comprehend
that the Rule against Perpetuities had no direct connection with
restraints on alienation, and that intending to devote a chapter to
these restraints, as he went on he saw that such a chapter would
be out of place in the contemplated treatise, and that he there-
for concluded to treat, and did treat, the subject of Restraints on
Alienation of Property in a separate essay.2 Unfortunately this
distinction has not been always perceived by the judges or the
legislature of Pennsylvania, and the word Perpetuity has fre-
quently been applied by them to two totally different things, the
incapacity of the owner of an interest to sever it from himaelf by
alienation, and the non-existence for a certain period of time of
any certain owner. In this article the word is used, as Professor
Gray uses it. The thing to be discussed, .is the rule invented to
prevent the creation of interests which remain contingent for an
undue time.
THE RULE.
Prof. Gray thus states the Rule. "No interest is good un-
less it must vest, if at all, not later than 21 years after some life
in being at the creation of the interest."'  "Perpetuities"
'Perpetuities, p. 2.
2These two doctrines, says Gray, "have had a separate development.
The attempts to combine them have led to confusion." Perpetuities: 92.
3Perpetuities p. i66. Cf. definition in Hillyard v. Miller, io Pa. 326;
quoted in Mifflin's Appeal, 121 Pa. 205.
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says Lowrie, C. J. "are grants of property wherein the vesting
of an estate or interest is unlawfully postponed. * * and
they are called perpetuities, not because the grant, as written,
would actually make them perpetual, but because they trans-
gress the limits which the law has set in restraint of grants that
tend to a perpetual suspense of title, or of its vesting, or, as it is
sometimes, with less accuracy expressed, to a perpetual preven-
tion of alienation. * * According to this definition, a pres-
ent gift to a charity is never a perpetuity, though intended to be
inalienable, * * and no vested grant is a perpetuity. The
law allows the vesting of an estate or interest, or the power of
alienation, to be postponed, and the accumulation of its increase
to be made previous to vesting, for the period of lives in being,
and twenty-one years and nine months thereafter, and all re-
straints upon the vesting, that may suspend it beyond that per-
iod, are treated as perpetual restraints, and therefore as void, and
consequently, the estates or interests dependent on them are void,
and nothing is denounced as a perpetuity that does not transgress
this rule."' Clark, J., quoting from Gray, says, "No interest
subject to a condition precedent is good, unless the condition
must be fulfilled, if at all, within twenty-one years after some
life in being at the creation of the interest." '
APPLICABLE TO WHAT PROPERTY
The rule forbidding the creation of interests to vest after too
long a time is applicable not merely to realty but also to person-
alty.6 It applies, e.g. to a legacy of the proceeds of asale of land'
to a legacy to one, subject to a limitation to another, on the oc-
currence of a certain event.'
THE PERIOD.
The period within which the vesting must occur, is usually
defined as a life or lives in being and twenty-one years after.
Among the 1,500,000,000 of people in the world, there is always
some life which is beginning when the devise or conveyance is
taking effect, and which will continue for 100 years or more.
4Philadelphia v. Girard's Heirs, 45 Pa. 9; Johnston's Estate, 185 Pa. 179;
Yard's Appeal, 64 Pa. 95,
5Lawrence's Estate, 136 Pa. 354.
'Gerber's Estate, 196 Pa. 366; Lawrence's Estate, 136 Pa. 354.
7Hubley v. Long, 2 Gr. 268.
8Kelso v. Dickey, 7 W. & S. 279; Diehl v. King 6 S. & R. 29; Weiserv.
Zeigler, z92 Pa. 394; Scott v. Price, 2 S. & R. 59.
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The rule does not allow a suspension of vesting until every life
existing when the limitation is made, is ended.9 Some deter-
minate life must measure.this period of suspense. It is not how-
ever, necessary that the life thus adopted, be that of a person in
whom any prior interest or estate is vested. A devise to the
children of A at his death, A being alive when the will goes into
operation, would be valid, although there v'as no earlier devise
to A. Nor is it necessary that the person whose life is the
measure, be in any way related, on the one hand, to the creator
of the estate, or on the othel, to the grantees or devisees of the
future interests. A probably may devise to the children of X
(a stranger to him), who shall be alive at the death of Y (a
stranger to both A and X), an estate in land or money. It is
enough that the testator or grantor contemplates the close of the
life of some determinate person as the point of time when the
estate is to vest, or the point of time within twenty-one years of
which, the estate is to vest.
THE TWUNTY-ONE Y ARS.
The period of twenty-one years may be added to that of a
life or lives in being, and a vesting postponed until its expira-
tion. Thus an estate may be given to such children of A (a
person in existence when the gift is made) as shall be alive twenty-
one years after A's death, or to such children of A as shall attain
the age of twenty-one years, or after an estate for twenty-one
years in X, commencing after a life estate in A, over to Z, should
certain things happen during those twenty-one years.° But, if
the period of vesting is twenty-five years," or twenty-two years"
after lives in being, it is too long deferred. A testator ordered that
his son A, and A's son B, or the survivor should have the income
of his farm during life. Then, after the death of the survivor,
and of all other children of B, and after the youngest grandchild
of B, had become twenty-two years old, he directed that the farm
be sold, and its proceeds divided among the then lawful heirs of
B. Since the period of this sale might possibly be more than
9In re Moore, i Ch. 936. "A testator bequeathed personal property for
the longest period allowed by law, that is to say, until the period of twenty-
one years from the death of the last survivor of all persons who shall be
living at my death?' The legacy was held bad for uncbrtainty. Gray,
Perpetuities , p, 187.
"Pepper's Estate, 120 Pa. 235.
nCoggins' Appeal 124 Pa. io. Cf. Boyd's Estate, i99 Pa. 487.
"2Gerbers' Estate, 196 Pa. 366.
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twenty-one years after the lives of A and B, the son and grand-
son, it was too remote. 3 A gift to A for life, remainder to her son
B, for life, with a proviso that on his reaching the age of twenty-
five years he should receive $25,000 absolutely. The validity of
the gift of $25,000 depends on 3 attaining twenty-five years within
twenty-one years after the death of A, who was the daughter of
the testator." A gift to grandchildren who shall have attained
the age of twenty-five years, after a gift to the widow and the
parent of such grandchildren for their lives, is for the same
reasonvoid." The term of twenty-one years may be taken in gross.
It need not be the infancy of the person in whom the interest is
intended to vest. 6 Doubtless, twenty-one years may be added
to X's life in being, when the first gift is to X, with an execu-
tory devite (no less than a remainder) over to another, but a gift
over to Y in defeasance of the estate in X, on Y's attaining thirty
years of age, would be void. A bequest was made to X abso-
lutely. If he died under thirty years of age, leaving issue, the
money was to remain invested and divided among his issue, on
their attaining thirty years of age. If this interest in the issue
did not vest until they reached thirty years of age, the gift to
them was void. 7
WHEN NO LIFE IS ADOPTED AS THE MEASURE.
When a life is adopted as the measure, a vesting within
twenty-one years after its close is early enough. When a period
is selected, which is not made to follow a life, it can never exceed
twenty-one years, and the possible period of gestation of the donee
of the interest. "If an absolute term is taken, and no anterior
term for a life in being is referred to, such an absolute term can-
not be longer," says Perry," "than twenty-one years." Hence
a devise to such persons as shall at the end of 75 years, be the
children or legal descendants of children of the testator, is void,
because the vesting is made to occur at a period of years exceeding
twenty-one years, and not at the end of twenty-one years or less,
after lives existing at the death of the testator." When the
"3Gerbers' Estate, 196 Pa. 366.
4Boyd's Estate 199 Pa. 487.
15Coggins' Appeal, 124 Pa, io.
"6Gray, Perpetuities, 19o.
lWard's Estate, 8 Dist. 701.
"8Trusts, P. 349.
1Johnston's Estate, 185 Pa. 179.
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period for vesting is too remote, the limitation is wholly void.
There is no validity for the part of the period which does not
exceed the period of the rule."
TIIE BEYOND TWENTY-ONE YEARS AFTER LIFE EXPRESSLY
SELECTED.
The vesting may be expressly made to occur after more than
twenty-one years after lives in being. In snch cases, there can
be no doubt as to the application of the rule. Cases of this class
are comparatively rare. Usually events are selected whose hap-
penings may or may not occur within the period limited by the
rule.
POSSIBILITY OF BREACH.
The event upon which the future interest is to vest must
from the beginning be sure to happen, if at all, within the per-
missible period. The validity or invalidity of the arrangement
must be known from the commencement, otherwise the object of
the rule could be defeated. The interest could be in abeyance
until the lapse of time should determine. If the estate is so con-
ditioned that it may not vest in the proper time is it void ab
initio.2" It is not necessary that it be clear that it will not vest
within the time nor that it be probable that it will not vest, nor
that its vesting within the time is in equilibrium. Though the
vesting withifi the time be probable, the rule will defeat the in-
terest, 22 afortiori if the vesting is merely possible.
2
1
GIFT TO A CLASS.
The contingent gift of an interest-may be made to a class of
persons. If there is a possibility that the event which is to cause
the vesting of the interest, will not occur with respect to any mem-
ber of the class, the gift is wholly void. A's bequest of an es-
tate to X as trustee, was for the payment to each of A's four
children, B, C, D and E, of one fourth of the net income. Upon
the death of any one of the children, the principal was to be given
to his or her children "who shall have attained or shall at-
tain the age of twenty-five years, and the issue of any who shall
die under that age, leaving issue." The latter gift was under-
2°Rhodes' Estate, 147 Pa. 227
21Hillyard v. Miller, To Pa 326; Rhodes' Estate, 147 Pa. 227; Smith's
Appeal,88 Pa. 492; Smith v. Townsend, 32 Pa.; 435; Donohue v. McNichol,
6i Pa. 73: Myers' Estate, 17 Phila. 425; Boyd's Estate, ig9 Pa 487.
2 2Gerber's Estate, 196 Pa. 366.
"Coggin's Appeal, 120 Pa. To.
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stood as not being to such children of a child, as at the child's
death should have attained twenty-five years of age, but to -such
as should, whether before or after the child's death, fattain that
age. It was possible that none of the children of a child, should
reach twenty-five years of age, until more than twenty-one years
after the child's death. Hence, the gift over to them was void. 2'
A bequest was made to a trustee to pay the interest on one
sixth of the estate to each of six children. After the death
of the last of the children and "the lapse of ten years from
the date when my youngest grand-child shall have become
of age" the principal of the estate was to be divided equally
among the then living grand children. Since a point of time
ten years after the majority of the youngest grand-child might
be more than twenty-one years after the death of the last child
of the donor, the gift to grand-children was wholly void. " After a
devise to a daughter for life and then to her children for life,
a devise in fee to her grand-children is void because they may all
come into existence beyond the period of the rule.26 A, having a
son B, and eight grandchildren, issue of B, and seven great-
grand-children, being grand-children of B, gave his estate to
trustees, and directed them, after the death of all his grand-
children, and after the youngest then living grand-child of B had
become twenty-two years of age, to sell the land and divide the
proceeds among the then lawful heirs of his son. The gift to the
heirs of the son might not vest until more than twenty-one'years
after the death of B and of all the children of B, and was void.2 7
A residuary estate was given to X in trust for A for life, then
for the issue of A for their lives, then upon the death of all the
issue of A, or upon the death of A without issue to survive, for
the then heirs of the testator. The gift to heirs was void, be-
cause they were not ascertainable until a period possibly too re-
mote, viz: the death of issue of A who were born after the tes-
tator's death, and whose death might occur more than twenty-
one years after the death of persons in being, when the devise
went into operation.' A gift for seventy-five years to X was
2 Coggin's Appeal, 124 Pa. io.
2Kountz's Estate, 213 Pa. 390.
26Davenport v. Harris, 3 Gr. z64.
27Gerber's Estate, 196 Pa. 366.
2Donohue v. McNichol. 61 Pa. 73. If the testator meant those who
were heirs at his death, A, being the only child, would have taken the land
in fee.
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in trust to pay the net income to the testator's children, or the
issue of children dying, during that period, and, at the end
thereof to sell the land and divide the proceeds among the then
living children, and the issue of children then dead. This direc-
tion to sell and gift of the proceeds were void.' A gift to a
trustee for sons, absolutely, their shares not to be paid until they
severally reach the age of thirty years, is followed by a provision
that if any of them dies under thirty years, leaving issue, the gift
shall go over to the issue when they reach thirty years of age.
Treating this gift to issue as contingent on their attaining the
age of thirty years, which they might not do until more than
twenty-one years after the lives in being, the gift to them was
void; and that to the sons became free from contingency."0
EFFECT OF VOIDNESS AS TO SOME MEMBERS OF A CLASS.
It is said by Paxson C. J." "Andif thegift is to a class and
it is void as to any ,of the class, it is void as to all. Authority is
scarcely needed for so familiar a proposition." He cites never-
theless, several English authorities, and a previous decision by
himself in Smith's Appeal.3" In this case, A had devised his
estate to trustees, to pay one-fourth of the income for life to
each of three daughters; at the death of any, to transfer this one-
fourth, to the daughter's appointees by will, or, no appointment
being made, to transfer it in equal portions to her children. If
no children survived her, the fund was to be held by trustees for
A's surviving children. One of A's daughters, B, appointed her
one-fourth to trustees, to paythe income thereon to her children,
living at her death (and who had also all been living during A's
lifetime), for life; and after their deaths, to transfer the share of
the one-fourth upon which any such child had received the
income during life, to the appointees by will of such child, or,
he or she making no appointment, to such person as would be
entitled, had he or she died intestate, owning the same. Re-
marking that the appointment of B must be conceived as written
into A's will, in order to determine its validity, Paxson, C. J.,
concludes that the gift by A to B for life, remainder to her
children, would have been bad "for the reason that it includes
2Johnston's Estate, 185 Pa. 179.
3°Wood's Estate, 8 Dist, 701.
3Coggins' Appeal 124 Pa. io. The same doctrine was implied, tacitly,
in Mifflin's Appeal 121 Pa. 205.
3288 Pa. 492.
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children born after the death of A. It is not a sufficient answer
to this to say that in point of fact there were no such after-born
children, and that all of Mrs. Smith's [B's] donees, were in esse
when Mr. Ryan [A] died. There might have been after-born
children, and because of this possibility the law strikes down tle
appointment as being within the rule prohibiting perpetuitfes.
Had the gift been to her sons and daughters eo nomine [he
clearly means nomninaiim] the case might have been different.
This could have been done by Mr, Ryan in his will, for the
parties were all living when he died." The chief justice was in
error in deciding that the gift after her death to children of his
daughter, not born during A's lifetime, was a violation of the
rule against perpetuities, as he himself almost concedes.33
Whether born in A's lifetime or not, they must be born in their
mother, B's lifetime. A gift to them was therefore a gift
vesting immediately at the close of a life in being when A's
devise began to operate But the chief justice repeats in the case
last referred to, his adhesion to the principle that if a gift is to a
class, to some of the members of which it is void, it is ihso facto
void as to all. Although in Smith's Appeal, some of the chil-
dren were alive in the testator's lifetime, others might have
come into existence, and at the time of the daughter's death, all
that had been born before the testator might have died, leaving
only those born subsequently thereto. It would be uncertain
then, on A's death, whether any existing children of B, the
daughter, would take under the terms of the gift; and, if any,
how many and what shares.3" Had A given to each of the chil-
dren of B, a determinate sum, the gift to each member of the
class "children" would have been separable from those to the
other members and the voidness of the gifts to such of them as
were not born till after A's death, would not have involved the
voidness of the gifts to such as were born before. "  When a gift
is to children of X, the possibility of the birth of children after the
33Coggins' Appeal, 124 Pa. to.
34Cf. Gray Perpetuities, p. 315.
3'Gray, Perpetuities, p. 324. Gray criticises Smith's Appeal (Perpetui-
ties p. 329.) as made in oblivion of this principle. But he fails to note thatPax-
son C. J. refrains from saying whether an appointment by the children of B,
the daughter, would under he- will, have been valid, and it is to this appoint-
ment that the remarks of Gray are directed. In holding that the gift to the
appointees of B was void, the decision, as Gray remarks, was wrong, because
it necessarily vested even in children born after A's death, within lives
in being.
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date of the gift, whatever the age of X, whether X be male or fe-
male, is always assumed. Even had X "been past the age of child-
bearing," said Penrose J., "when the testator died, the legal
possibility of issue, would make the limitation [i. e. to children
of X, a daughter of the testator, who should reach the age of
twenty-five years] void.'"
THE VESTING.
The rule prohibits the undue postponement of the vesting of
an estate or interest; and not of the commencement of the pos-
session or enjoyment of it. If A has a term of 1000 years, B's
remainder or reversion thereupon, is not invalid because his pos-
session will be so long deferred. In determining therefore,
whether a limitation offends the rule against perpetuities, the in-
quiry must be directed to the time of the vesting, and not to that
of taking possession. :" A legacy may vest before the time at
which it is to be paid to the legatee. A bequest being made of
the income to two children during life, and, the fund producing
which at their decease was to be divided equally among their
children, who might then be living, or the issue of children then
dead, "as they arrive at legal age," the gift of the fund was
valid; because it vested in the children, or issue, instantly upon
the death of the life legatees. Their majority was simply the
time of payment.' In Barclay v. Lewis"' a bequest was made to
trustees, who were to pay the income less annuities to sons, to
the testator's wife and daughter. The estate after the death of
the wife and daughter was to be held for the benefit of the chil-
dren of the sons and the daughter, and until such children should
be twenty-one years of age and was then to be equally divided
among them. It was held th~at this interest vested in the chil-
:"*Rhodes' Estate, 147 Pa. 227. Gerbers' Estate, 196 Pa..366.
:I7Coggin's Appeal, 124 Pa. to; Hubley v. Long, 2 Gr. 268; Lawrence's
Estate, 136 Pa. 354; Siddall's Estate, 189 Pa. T27, Johnston's Estate, 185 Pa.
179; Kounta's Estate, 213 Pa. 390. In Rhodes' Estate, 147 Pa. 227 was a
life estate in a daughter, remainder to testator's nephews and nieces. A
codicil provided that should children survive the daughter under twenty-
five years of age, they should receive an annuity, and that the estate remain
in the hands of the trustee without division until these children reach the
age of twenty-five years. This simply postponed the time of payment not
the time 6f vesting of the legacies to nephews and nieces; The gift to
them did not offend the rule against perpetuities.
:14Siddall's Estate 186 Pa. 127; Smith's Estate, 2o Pa. 604.
'67 Pa. 316.
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dren at birth, but that the time of enjoyment was deferred until
their respective majorities. A gift of certain annuities was
made. After the death of the annuitants, the income was di-
rected to be paid annually to a charity until the sums received
by it should amount to $20,000. Then from the corpus was to
be taken $500,000 and paid to the University of Pennsylvania.
The last gift was vested from the death of the testator. Posses-
sion of it only, was deferred.' When a will contains no expres-
sion of a gift except the direction to pay, there is no vesting of
an interest until the arrival of the time for payment. A's will
directed that after the death of the last child of the testator, "and
the lapse of ten years from the date when my youngest grand-
child shall have become of age, the principal of the whole estate
shall be equally divided among my grand-children." No inter-
est vested before the lapse of the ten years."' An interest is con-
tingent not when given in default of the execution of a power
conferred upon the prior taker, (in which case it would be con-
sidered vested, but subject to be divested by the execution of the
power) but when given in sequence after a prior contingent
estate, which fails. Thus a devise to A for life, then to the ap-
pointee of A for life, remainder to the children of the appointee
but, if there should be no children, to X, an existing person, the
gift to X is contingent until the appointee's death. If the'gift
to his children is void, because of the rule against perpetuities, so
is the gift to X. 4
WHAT IS VESTING.
The capacity of a remainder, to take effect immediately in
possession, if the particular estate were to terminate, is the cri-
terion of a vested, as distinguished from a contingent remainder.
It is the uncertainty of the right of enjoyment, and not the un-
certainty of its actual enjoyment,which renders a remainder con-
tingent. "The present capacity of taking effect in possession-if
the possession were to become vacant-distinguishes a vested
from a contingent remainder, and not the certainty that the pos-
4°Lennig's Estate, i54 Pa. 209.
41Kountz's Estate, 213 Pa. 390. In Shallcross' Estate, 200 Pa. 122 a be-
quest was made to trustees, for seven minor children (named) of a son, un-
til they'severally should arrive at twenty-one years of age. A codicil ex-
tended the time of payment to the age of twenty-five. The legacies were
held to be vested and the postponement of payment beyond majority, void.
There were no expressions making the trust a spendthrift one.
42Boyd's Estate, i99 Pa. 487.
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session will ever become vacant while the remainder continues.'"'
A remainder was held vested because it "was ready at any time
after the death of Ann Appleton, to come into the possession
of the Baptist Union whenever and however the life estate might
determine.""
WHEN EVEN A VESTED ESTATE IS WITHIN THE RULE.
In Morris v. Fisher,' 5 the testator devised land to A for life,
remainder for ninety-nine years, to B, if he should live so long;
if he should die within the ninety-nine years, to the issue of his
body; after the expiration of the term, or on the death of B with-
out issue, to C, a living person and the heirs male of his body.
Sultzberger, J., held the limitation over to C, though vested, void,
remarking that the word perpetuities in Pennsylvania, includes
estates which are inalienable, as well as estates6 which are had
for remoteness. The judgment was reversed by consent of
parties. "This" says Gray, "looks as if the learned counsel for
the defendant had little hopes of holding his judgment. It does
not seem possible that he could or that a like decision of the U.
S. C. C. for the Western District of Arkansas can be sustained."
CONTINGENT REMAINDERS.
That the rule against perpetuities applies to contingent
remainders in land is the opinion of Prof. Gray.' It seems to
have been tacitly assumed to apply to them in Pennsylvania.
"All future estates," says Paxson C. J., "limited upon a life
estate, which are not sure to take effect within twenty-one years
and the usual fraction after the determination of the life estate
are void in their creation.""6  There are, perhaps, no cases in
which a contingent remainder in land has been declared void
because the vesting was postponed beyond the period of the rule.
The cases are usually trusts. If A gives land or personalty to a
trustee in trust to pay the income or rents to B, during his life,
and then to transfer the land or personalty to the children of B,
that may then be living,"' or to the appointees by will of B,' these
4Kountz's Estate, 2i 3 Pa. 390.
"Lawrence's Estate, 136 Pa. 354.
158 Dist. 161.
46Perpetuities, p. 174.
'TPerpetuities, p. 256.
48Coggins' Appeal, r24 Pa. io; Lawrence's estate, 136 Pa. 353.
49Siddall's Estate, i8o Pa. 127; Rhodes' Estate, 147 Pa. 227.
Snith's Appeal, 88 Pa. as corrected by later decisions.
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remainders are valid, because the vesting is not deferred beyond
the proper time. A devising his estate to trustees, who were to
pay the income to his wife for life, then one-fourth of the income
to each of his daughters during life; then on the death of any
daughter, to transfer the corpus to her children "who shall have
attained or shall attain the age of twenty-five years," the last
limitation would be valid, if it meant that, at the death of the
daughter the property was to vest in such children as were then
twenty-five years old. If it meant that the property was to vest
in all the children on their attainment at any time, whether
before or after the daughter's death, of the age of twenty-five
years, it would be an executory devise, and not a remainder, and
moreover, the time of vesting might transcend the period of the
rule." A gift was made to executors in trust to pay the rents and
income to A and B, grandchildren of the testator, during their
lives. After the decease of either, his share was to be for the
use of such of his children as might then be living, or of the issue
of any children that might have died, absolutely. If either A or
B died without leaving issue to survive him, or if leaving issue,
the issue should all die under the age of twenty-one years with-
out issue, the share of A or B, should go to the survivor, or his
issue. If both A and B died without issue surviiring, or if, leaving
issue, that issue should die within twenty-one years of age,
without issue, the shares given to them were to pass over to
others. This arrangement did not violate the rule against per-
petuities. The limitation was not upon the death of issue
generally, but at the death of A or B, or within twenty-one years
thereafter. 12 A gift by deed after a life estate in A, in trust for
such children of A as shall survive her, or the issue of any, that
may then have died before her, leaving issue, upon their attain-
ment of twenty-one years of age, or their being no such children
or issue, that reach the age of twenty-one years, then to such
persons as would be entitled, had the testator died without issue
after the death of A. These gifts over were not too remote.
A dying without issue, the next of kin of the settler, who would
have been entitled had she died at the moment of A's death,
received the gift. " ' A gift to widow during life, of so much of
the income as is necessary, and of the excess to the five children
5 Coggins' Appeal, 124 Pa. io.
•-Weinbrenner's Estate, 173 Pa. 440.
5Phillips' Appeal 93 Pa. 45.
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during life. After their death respectively, to their children.
The gift to the children of children, vesting at the close of the
life of children, who were in being when the will went into effect,
is valid.5'
A devised property in trust for B, during his life. If he
died without issue living, the property was to be delivered to A's
"lawful heirs." If he died leaving issue, they were to have a
life estate, and after their death, then it was to be for the use of
A's lawful heirs. It was held that, if the ultimate use to heirs,
meant such persons as, at the death of B, or the issue of B, would
be heirs, it was too remote, since the persons taking might possi-
bly not be ascertained until the end of a life which had not
begun until after the death of A. If the ultimate use to heirs
was to persons who were heirs at A's death, it was equivalent
to an intestacy. But B dying without issue, the gift to heirs
took effect, and this was within lives in being. Though then the
remainder, after the life estate to the issue of B was too remote,
the distinct remainder after the death of B without issue was not
too remote.55
REMAINDER CONTINUED.
A devised real and personal property to a trustee, in trust
for his sons B and C. On the death: of either leaving issue, one
half was devised to this issue. If either died before the other, his
half was devised to the other in fee. If both died leaving no issue
living, the estate was devised over to D and E in equal shares, in
fee. On the death of B, without issue his. half passed to C in
fee. C dying childless, his widow was entitled under C's devise
to her of the part thus obtained from B. The gift to the sur-
vivor of B and C was in fee. C subsequently died without issue.
Thereupon, the gift over of C's original half, took effect as a re-
mainder, and of the half obtained in the death of B, as- an execu-
tory devise. Both remainder and executory devise were valid,
since the event on which they were suspended was sure to
happen, if at all, within lives in being when the testator died."
A bequeathed bonds to B in trust to pay the interest thereon, to
two grandsons C and D, and should either die without heirs or
children, to deliver his share of the bonds to X, his heirs and as-
51Smith's Estate, 210 Pa. 6o4.
5Donoiue v. McNichol. 6i Pa. 73. Gray criticises this case, Perpet-
uities, p. 3o6.
6Lovett v, Lovett, to Phila. 537.
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signs. This created a life estate in C and D, and a contingent re-
mainder in X. The trust was therefore valid 
7
SALE DIRECI'ED.
The rule of perpetuities applies to interests in the pro-
ceeds of a sale of land, directed to be made, as well as to interests
in the land itself. If the sale is to take place beyond lives in
being and twenty-one years subsequently, the direction to sell
and distribute the proceeds will be void; otherwise not. A gift
of land to a trustee for the benefit of A and B, children of the
testator, for their lives, is followed by a direction to the trustee
within one year after the death of the longer liver of the two
sons to sell the land, and divide the proceeds, one half among the
children of A, and the other among the, children of B. If any of
these children of A and B are minors at the time of the sale their
share in the money is to remain a chai-ge on the land, and is to be
paid, with the interest to him when he reaches majority. If he
should die before becoming tWentv-one years of age, the moneyis to
be paid to his heirs as they arrive at twenty-one years. For some
reason an act of assembly is procured which authorizes a sale before
the death of the survivor of the two children of the testator. The
court, holding the direction to sell valid, and that the children of
A, who died before the sale, had a vested interest, refused to order
their shares in the money, to be paid -to them because they were
still in their minority.' A ppwer given to trustee to sell:within
ten years59 or any other number of years not exceeding twenty-
one, after the creation of the power would be valid. A power to
sell not before, but at the expiration of seventy-five years from
the estallishment- of the power, would be void.' -A power to
sell within twenty-one years after a life that is in existence when
the power is created, would be.valid ' i a fortiori one to sell within
lives in being." Thus a devise of a house. to two sons; on the
death of either without issue then surviving it was given to the
survivor. On the death of both without issue, to survive them,
17Weiser v. Zeigler, 192 Pa. 394. The rule against perpetuities was not
violated.
5sHublby v. Long, 2 Gr. 268. The time of payment was postponed, not
that of vesting.
"gKeyser's Appeal, 57 Pa. 236.
60Johnsion's Estate. 185 Pa.; Cresson v, Ferree, 70 Pa. 446.
6'Richardson's Estate, 16 Phila. 326,
62Cresson v. Ferree, 70 Pa. 446.
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the house was directed to be sold and the proceeds divided among
the surviving heirs of the testator. The direction to sell was
valid. 3
THE TIME OF ENDING OF AN ESTAT.
The rule concerning perpetuities prescribes nothing as to the
duration of the estate which is once brought into existence.
Within the permitted period a fee, an estate for 1000 years, or a
life estate may be made to vest, and thus vesting it will be valid.
If the estates following it are vested at the same time, or not
later than lives in being Pis twenty-one years, they also will be
valid. After the death of annuitants, the testator directed that
payments of the income of his estate should be made to the
Academy of Natural Sciences until they amounted to $20,000,
and after the completion of these payments, gave S500,000 of
the corpus to the University of Pennsylvania. Of the gift to the
Academy, the court said, "It takes effect immediately at the ex-
piration of lives in being at the death of the testator; and an in-
terest which thus begins, is not obnoxious to the rule, though it
may end at a very remote time."" An estate vested in a trustee
for seventy-five years, commencing immediately after the death
of the testator, is not forbidden by the rtile.'
SERIES OF CONTINGENT BEQUESTS.
A's will directed that if, her husband surviving her, he
should not divide his estate equally among their children, or if
he should, during his life give to the daughters shares of his
estate, without giving a corresponding share to the son C, her
executor should invest her estate, pay the income to C during
life; then transfer the estate to his appointees by will, or, he
making no appointment, to his right heirs. There was in this,
no violation of the rule against perpetuities. The event on which
the bequests were suspended, must occur during lives in being.
The ulterior gift was to persons who would be alive at the death
of the son, who was alive when the will went into operation."
EXECUTORY DEVISE.
A devise to persons not in existence, or not yet having the
qualities which will entitle them, is not void, if they must come
"Nicholson v. Bettle, 57 Pa. 384.
"Lennig's Estate, 154 Pa. 209; Lawrence's Estate; Ronckendorff's Es-
tate, Dist. 258. Johnston's Estate, 185 Pa. 179.
"Johnston's Estate, 185 Pa. 179.
6Brooks' Estate, 140 Pa. 84.
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into existence or acquire these qualities, within the period of the
rule. Hence, a devise to A (who is unmarried) his wife and
children, will, on his subsequent marriage and the birth of chil-
dren, give a lifeestate to them concurrent with his own. Although
the wife's life estate is contingent until her marriage, and that
of the children contingent until their birth, these events must
happen, if at all, during A's lifetime."
CONDITIONAL LIMITATIONS.
Land or personalty may be given to A, for a term of years,
for life, or in fee, with a proviso that if a certain thing
shall or shall not happen, A's interest shall come to an end, and
an interest similar or dissimilar in duration, pass to B. A's interest
is vested, but subject to liability to be divested. B's interest is
contingent until the occurrence of the event. If this event may
occur beyond lives in being and twenty-one years, or beyond
twenty-one years, when no life is adopted as a measure, the rule
against perpetuities is violated. The gift ever is void. A devise
was made to life tenants, followed by a remainder in fee, upon
the "express condition" that the owners shall not build in the
garden spot on the south end of the dwelling house, and in case
of breach of this condition, the estate was transferred to trustees
for a charity. The limitation over was void.' Bequest to a son
of a share in an estate, but if he died under thirty years of age,
leaving issue, his share was to remain invested, and to be divided
among his issue when they should reach the age of thirty years.
As this bequest over did not vest in the issue until they reached
the age of thirty years, they not having been in existence when
the bequest went into operation, it was void."9 A devise being
to a church in fee, the proviso that 'if at any time the same shall
be directly or indirectly disposed of, then this devise shall become
void" is invalid, not merely because it is a restraint upon aliena-
tion,"0 but because the forbidden conveyance might occur at any
time however remote. 1
67Mitchell v. Long, 8o Pa. 5x6.
63Smith v. Townsend, 32 Pa. 434.
69Ward's Estate, 8 Dist. 701. A gift of income to a son for life; then
to the children of the son. Upon the death of any such children, without
leaving issue to survive, the gift was transferred to the testator's other
children. This -provision for transfer was probably void; Myers' Estate,
17 Phila. 425.
"0Not a good reason, in the case of a charity, possibly.
"1St. Luke's Church, i Walker, 283.
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FAILURE OF ISSUE.
When land is devised to A and his heirs, with a proviso that
upon the failure of issue, it shall pass over to B, the validity of
the direction in favor of B will depend on the time within which
the contemplated failure of issue is to occur. If it is to occur at
A's death, or within twenty-one years after A's death, the gift
over would be valid." If it is to occur, at any time whether
within or beyond that period; aforliori, if it is to occur beyond
and not within that period, the gift over would be void "" That a
life estate in X precedes a fee in A, which is subject to this lon-
ditional limitation, does not affect the principle which determines
the validity of this limitation."' A devise to A for life, is followed
by one to her child in fee, but if the child should not live to be
twenty-one years, nor marry, then over to X. The limitation to X
is valid, the child dying before becoming twenty-one years old and
unmarried."m  If in a devise to A and his heirs, it is limited that
if he should not will it, at his death, the estate should go over to
B, the limitation over is valid.7" A devise to a trustee for A,
with direction, if the land is sold, to pay the proceeds over to A,
if she has issue, or if she lives to be twenty-five years old, other-
wise to pay the proceeds to X. A died at twenty-three years of
age, without issue. The limitation over to X was valid. It
occurred within lives in being." A failure of issue at the death
of a life legatee, or within twenty-one years thereafter, is not too
remote."8  A devise in trust for A and B for life, remainder on
the death of either without issue, to the survivor in fee; remain-
der, as to the survivor's original share, to X, on his dying with-
out surviving issue, and executory devise of the share coming
from the first of the two to die, on the same event: the executory
devise is valid, since it must take effect, if at all, at the end of a
life in being when the testator died."
.2Ingersoll's Appeal, 86 Pa. 240.
73 1n Buchanan v. Sheffer, 2 Y. 374, the court did not determine whether
the failure of issue meant was definite or indefinite. In either case, the
husband of the devisee took curtesy.
71De Haas v. Bunn, 2 Pa. 335.
75Wells v. Ritter, 3 Wh. 208.
76Bcyd v. Bigham, 4 Pa. 102.
TKelso v. Dickey, 7 W. & S. 279.
'Weinbrenner's Estate, 773 Pa. 440.
79Lovett v. Lovett, io Phila. 537.
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CONDITIONAL LIMITATIONS AS TO MONEY
Executory devises of money, or chattels, as well as of land,
are possible. A gave $550 to a daughter, payable in install-
ments after she reached the age of eighteen years. The will
provided that if she should die before attaining the age of twenty-
one years, unmarried or without issue, then, in either case, the
bequest should devolve on another. Understanding this to mean
that if she died under twenty-one years. and unmarried, or died
under twenty-one years, without issue, though married, the
legacy should go over, but not if she died over twenty-one, with-
out issue, or under twenty-one, but with issue, the legacy was
held not divested by her death over twenty-one being married,
but leaving no issue." The limitation over was not void, because
it occurred, if at all, at the close of the legatee's life.
POWER OF APPOINTMENT.
The power to appoint may itself be made capable of being
exercised beyond lives in being plus twenty-one years, or beyond
twenty-one years. When the creator of the power intends it to
subsist for this period, it is wholly bad, because it may not be
exercised, and the interest to be created by its exercise may not
vest, until after the permissible period.8 ' A power to sell land
must belimited to the period of the rule, for the land is appointed to
the person who may become the buyer, and the interest to becreated
by its exercise would be contingent until such exercise. "We
may concede," says Sharswood J., "that a general power over
an estate without limitation of time-unless after an estate tail-
would violate the rule against the creation of perpetuities.""2
When a power is given to X to be exercised by him only, it is
limited to his lifetime and is not, therefore, of too great a dura-
tion,' and when the time for exercising the power is not defined
by its creator, it need not be void because the courts holding that
it must be exercised within a reasonable time, may compel its
exercise therein,' and probably forbid its exercise beyond. A
special power to appoint by deed, or a power to appoint by will
8OScottv. Price, 2 S.&R. 59.
,"Lawrence's Estate, 136 Pa. 354.
8'2Cresson v. Ferree, 70 Pa. 446. The power was here limited to lives in
being and was valid. CL Richardson's Estate, 16 Phila. 326; Keyser's
Appeal, 57 Pa. 236.
83Lawrence's Estate, 136 Pa. 354.
"'Cooper's Estate, i5o Pa. 576. Cf. Marshall's Estate, 138 Pa. 260.
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given to the unborn child of a living person is bad because it
may not be exercised within the proper time. A general power
in this unborn person is so like an estate, that it will be valid.'
VALIDITY OV APPOINTMENT.
Even when the power itself is not bad, the particular mode in
which it is exercised, may be bad. Generally, the validity of an
appointment is to be determined by regarding the appointment as
having been made by the will or deed which created it.8" If the
limitation, made by the appointment, if made by the donor of the
power instead of the power itself, would have been good, the
appointment will be good; if the limitation made by the donor
would have been bad, the appointment will be bad. "The obvious
test," said Paxson J., "of the validity of the execution of the
power is to write that portion of Mrs. Smith's will [containing the
appointment] into the will of Lewis Ryan [the donor of the
power and of the estate] ." The period of suspension of the
vesting of the interest created or to be created by the appoint-
ment, is to be considered as beginning, not with the appointment,
but with the creation of the power-' Under this principle, when A
devised land to B for life, or to X in trust for B, for life, remain-
der to her appointees by will, it was held that a devise by B, in
the exercise of this power, to B's children for life, remainder to
the Baptist Union for Ministerial Education was valid, both as
to the children's life estate and to the Union's remainder. 9 A
devises an estate in trust for his daughter B for life, then for
such persons as B shall appoint by will. B, by will, gave the
estate for his life to her husband, remainder to her son C for life,
remainder in fee to C's issue. C was B's son, born after the
death of A. The gift to him was valid. C's estate vested at
the death of B. It is immaterial whether he was born before or
8Mifflin's Appeal, 121 Pa. 2o.
6fIf a daughter appoints $z5,ooo to her son on his reaching the age of
twenty-five years and he is already so old that he will reach that age in
twenty-one years from her own death, the appointment is sound. Boyd's
Estate, 199 Pa. 487.
8'Smith's Appeal, 88 Pa. 492; Ronckendorff's Estate, ix Pa. C.C. 447.
"Lawrence's Estate, 136 Pa. 354.
8Lawrence's Estate, 136 Pa. 354. Attention is directed to the fact that
all the children of B were born during the lifetime of A, but it is difficult to
see how that is important. It had been erroneously held in Smith's Appeal
88 Pa. 492, that the gift to the children for life, in a similar arrangement
was void, though all the children had been born in the original testator's
lifetime.
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after the death of A." A devised his property in trust for his
daughter B, for life, remainder to her appointee by will. B
appointed to a trustee in trust for her son C, for life; remainder
should C leave children and widow, to them in such proportions
as C, should by will appoint. If he made no appointment, then
in trust for those, who under the law would be his heirs, he
owning the property in fee. Should only a widow survive C, one-
third of the estate was given to her, unless the son C, by will,
ordered otherwise. The appointment by B to the widow and
children of C, was bad, because they might not come into
existence within twenty-one years of B's death, C not having
been born when A died. 91
WHEN THE POWER IS GENERAL.
A power to appoint to particular persons, or to appoint by
will and not by deed, is a special power, and the principle thus
stated is applicable to it. The power of vesting under an ap-
pointment made in pursuance of it must not exceed lives in being,
when the power was created, and twenty-one years. But, when
the power is general; when, i. e., the donee of the power may,
appoint by deed, or by will, and may appoint anybody, and
therefore himself, he may be considered as virtual owner of the
land or chattels, and the vesting of the interest therein created
by his appointment will need to occur only within lives in being
at the time of the exercise of the power plus twenty-one years,
and not within lives in being when the power was bestowed,
plus twenty-one years. In Mifflin's Appeal" A by deed con-
veyed land to X in trust for B for B's lifetime; and from her
death, in trust for such uses and estates as she, by her last will
should order and appoint. The deed however directed that if B
should at any time desire to sell or mortgage the land and should
by writing order and direct it to be sold or mortgaged for her
use, X should sell or mortgage it. There were therefore two
powers in B, one to appoint by will, and the other to require the
trustee to sell or mortgage for her benefit. Forty years after the
deed was made, B died and not having exercised through the
trustee the power to sell or mortgage, devised the land to Z in
trust for her children during their lifetime, and on the decease
9°Ronckendorff's Estate, i Dist. 258; ij Pa. C, C. 447. Whether the
remainder in fee to C's issue was valid, not considered.
-9'Boyd's Estate, "i9g Pa. 487.
92121 Pa. 205. Cf. Lawrence's Estate, 136 Pa. 354.
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of any child, in trust to convey his or her share to any issue of
such child. Some of A's children had been born before, some
were born after the execution of the deed. The latter were
therefore not in existence when the deed was made, and the gift
to their issue might not vest until a point of time beyond lives in
being at that time and twenty-one years. The issue of such
children were nevertheless entitled to the land, because the re-
mainder vested in them not later than the close of the life of the
children of B, all of whom were alive when her will went into
effect. B was treated as the owner, and her appointment was re-
garded as if it had been a primary disposition of her own land.
APPOINTMENT OF PERSONS NOT IN EXISTENCE WHEN DONOR
OF POWER DIES.
The fact that the power permits an appointment of a re-
mainder to persons who are not in existence during the life of
the donor, does not impair the power or the appointment under
it, of persons to take the remainder, who are of come into ex-
istence during the donor's life, or within twenty-one years there-
after.9" A by will gave a part of his estate for life to his son B,
and after B's death to the use of such of his children and issue,
and in such shares and estates, as B should by will appoint. If
B made no appointment, then to the use of his children or issue,
as tenants in common. In default of issue, then to such persons
as B should by will appoint. In default of appointments, to the
other children of the testator. B left surviving him only one child,
C, so that B's power of appointment which was simply to select be-
tween two or more children became void. B nevertheless by
will declared that until the expiration of twenty-one years after
the death of the surviving brother or sister of B, he bequeathed
the property to C, upon the express condition that he shall not
convey it or do anything that would lead to its being taken in
execution, or under the insolvent or bankrupt laws; and provided
that if C did any of these things, and died within the twenty-
one years, leaving issue, the estate should go to the issue; if no
issue, over to others. As, B having only one child, his power
of appointment lapsed, the appointment made by him was void.
Had he had the power, the appointment would not have infringed
the rule against perpetuities, though adds Paxson, J., "ap-
proaching dangerously near the border." The gift to C for
93Lawrence's Estate, 136 Pa. 354; Ronckendorff's Estate, i Dist. 258;
Boyd's Estate, ig Pa. 487.
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twenty-one years after the death of brothers and sisters of B was
valid, though he had not been born till after the death of A.
The gift over, within the twenty-one years, would have involved
no perpetuity because it would occur within twenty-one years
after lives in. being when A died.9" A decision' had been made
by Paxson, J., in 1879, that when A devised a life estate to B,
with powerof appointing the remainder, an appointment by B of
the remainder to a person who was not in existence during A's
lifetime, or to a class of persons some of whom might prove to be
persons who had not thus been in existence, was void. The law
had for centuries tolerated remainders after a life estate, con-
tingent until the close of that estate, without regard to the ex-
istence or non-existence of the remaindermen at the time of the
creation of them. Yet that is precisely what was here condemned.
Surprising then, as this decision was, it is still more surprising
that ten years later Paxson, then Chief Justice was appar-
ently not yet convinced of its erroneousness. "Subsequent re-
flection" he remarked" "has left some doubt (!) in my mind as
to the soundness of the ruling in that case upon the main ques-
tion involved." No doubt of its error survived, when Law-
rence's Estate9 ' was written.
EFFECT OF VIOLIATION OF THE RULE.
When the rule is violated by any provision in a will or deed,
the whole will or deed is not vitiated, but only such estates or
interests thereby created which contravene the rule. A devise to A
for life followed by a contingent executory devise to vest thirty
years after the close of the life estate, would not be void, because
of the voidness of the executory devise.99 A devise to A for life
remainder to such persons as A shall appoint. A appoints her
children for life, remainder to X. Though the remainder to X
were too remote from the death of the testator, the appointment to
the children of A, for life, would not be invalid.9 Norwould avested
interest, to take effect in possession after the expiration of the
9"Peffer's Appeal, 120 Pa. 235.
95Smith's Appeal, 88 Pa. 492. It was followed in Gardette's Estate, i6
Phila. 264. The correctness of Smith's Appeal is tacitly assumed by Green,
3., in Mifflin's Appeal, 1i Pa. 2o5.
96Croggins' Appeal, 124 Pa. io.
97136 Pa. 354.
9 Hillyard v. Miller, io Pa. 326! Lennig's Estate, 154 Pa. 209.
"Lawrence's Estate, 135 Pa. 354; Van Sykel's Estate, 9 Dist. 367.
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void contingent interest, be impaired. On the contrary, the en-
joyment of it would be accelerated.. If there is a valid residuary
devise or bequest, it will carry prior contingent devises or be-
quests which the rule annuls. If there is no residuary devise,
the testator will die intestate as to the interest which he has in-
effectively disposed of. A gift to a son for life, remainder to his
children for their lives; remainder to such person asshall at their
death be heirs of the testator. The second remainder being too
remote, the only child of the testator, took it as a reversion as
heir.' When a conditional limitation is void, not only does the
estate contingent upon it not come into existence, but the prior
estate which was intended to be divested by the event, becomes
absolute. A devise in fee was subject,-to the condition that if
buildings should ever be erected at a certain spot on the land, it
should pass over to a charity. Since the limitation over was
upon too remote an event, the fee alreadiy devised was absolute.'
If, the will directing the estate to go to the appointees of X, or in
default of appointment to Y, the appointment is invalid be-
cause violating the rule concerning perpetuities, the gift to Y will
take effect.'
EFFECT OF VOIDNESS ON PRIOR TRUST..
A trust may be made, under which for a time, certain per-
sons are to receive the income from the estate, and at the end of
which time, the estate in specie, or transformed into money by a
sale, is to pass to certain persons, who may or may not be the same
as those who have received the income. If the ultimate trust is
void because of violating the rule against perpetuities, will its
voidness infect the intermediate trust with voidness? Why should
it? If an intermediate legal estate is not void, because an ulter-
ior estate is, why should an intermediate trust be? The evidence
may convince the court that the testator would not have
erected the trust, except to realize the ultimate destination of his
estate, and, disappointing him with regard to the latter, by the
application of the rule concerning perpetuities, may be convinced
that he will not be disappointed with regard to the former, by
quashing it. The doctrine is not unfamiliar that a trust will not
be sustained after the objects of its establishment are accom-
'Donohue v. McNichols, 6i Pa. 73; Davenport v. Harris, 3 Gr. 164;
Gerber's Estate, 196 Pa.; Boyd's Estate, i9g Pa. 487.
2Smith v. Townsend, 32 Pa. 434; Ward's Estate, 8 Dist. 7o.
3Pepper's Appeal, 12o Pa; Gardette's Estate, 16 Phila. 264.
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plished, or after the accomplishment of them has become unat-
tainable. There is however always grave room for error, in de-
ciding what the object of the testator was. In Johnston's Es-
state4 a trust was created for seventy-five years. The trustee
was to collect the rents and income, and pay them to the testa-
tor's children, and the children of such of them as might die.
After the seventy-five years the land was to be sold and the pro-
ceeds paid to the then living children, or the children of children
then dead. It was quite possible to say that the testator's in-
tention in erecting this trust, was to preserve his estate from loss
from the possible improvidence or misfortune of his children.
He might have directed a trust for the life of all his children,
and no one would have suspected that his object was anything
other than to prevent the hazards of that control which is inci-
dent to a legal ownership, a perfectly legitimate object. But,
after thus disposing of the estate for the lives of the children, it
would still remain necessary to die intestate as to the residue, or
to dispose of it.
How from the fact that a disposition is made of this residue,
the inference can be drawn that the trust existed for the sake of
this disposition, and not this disposition for the sake of the
trust, of which it was a necessary complement, it is rather hard
to discover. Yet it was the opinion of the court that the seventy-
five years trust existed for the sake of the final disposition, and
not vice versa. "It will not be pretended (!) that the particular
estate was designed to serve any purpose of its own, distinct
from the limitation over. On the contrary, it is evident (!) that
it was adopted simply as a means to an end; a hook upon which
to hang suspended, a tied-up estate, until such time as testator
desired it to be opened and parted. How does it in any way,
enforce testator's wishes, to leave the hook in its place, when
there is no estate to suspend upon it?" But why gratuitously
say that the trust was adopted as the means to the postponement
of the vesting of the estate? What apparent reason was there
for desiring the postponement j er se? Why refuse to see that
the primary and only object of the testator was the avoidance of
alienability by children, so that their enjoyment of the rents and
income during life should not be imperilled? Nevertheless,
because the direction to sell and distribute after seventy-five
years was void, the court decided that the trust during the
'i85 Pa. 179.
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seventy-five years was void, and the devise was wholly void.'
The principle of this decision has been adopted in two later cases,
in Gerber's Estate,6 where the auditor's imagination was power-
fully wrought up by the figure of the "hook," and in Kountz's
Estate7 where the language of Potter J., would suggest that he
thought that whenever a later disposition fails because of the
rule against perpetuities, earlier dispositions in trust will fail.
Remarking that the period of sale was too remote, he adds "That
being the case, the antecedent particular estate would fail also,
and the heirs at law of the "estator are entitled to immediate
possession." However, in Moore's Estate,8 a trust for children
was held valid, despite the voidness of a remainder given to a
charity in less than a calendar month before the death of the
donor, and in Goddard's Estate the voidness of an ulterior dis-
position was assumed not to vitiate an intervening trust.
GIFTS TO CHARITIES.
The act of May 9th, 1889, and later acts substantially reen-
acting it, declare that no disposition of property for any religious
or charitable use shall fail for want of a trustee, or because given
in perpetuity. The word "'perpetuity" has too senses, and prob-
ably has them here, describing an incapacity to alienate a vested
estate, and an undue suspension of the vesting of an estate. A
free library, 0 a supply of books, instruments, machines for tech-
nological instruction. in an university, and a gift for free scholar-
ships, are charities." A gift to a university in aid of education,
is not rendered invalid because it is not to vest until a time which
may exceed lives in being plus twenty-one years.' The fact that
a Free Library Association is not incorporated when the devise
to it, intended to operate at death, is made, and that it may not
become incorporated for more than twenty-one years does not
avoid it. A corporation being formed in order to receive the
devise, will be able to take it.'" Indeed, independently of
5Gray, Perpetuities, p. 221, says of this decision, it "seems difficult to
maintain."
Gj96 Pa. 366.
7213 Pa. 390.
8198 Pa. 611.
S198 Pa. 454.
"0Pepper's Estate, 154 Pa. 331.
"Lennig's Estate, 154 Pa. 209.
"2Lennig's Estate, 154 Pa. 209. Cf. Franklin's Estate, i5o Pa. 437.
'3Peppers' Estate, 154 Pa. 331.
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statute, gifts to charities have been sustained, notwithstanding
their want of incorporation."4 In Smith v. Townsend,'" a gift in
defeasance of a prior fee, on the happening of a certain event, to
a charity was treated as void, because the event might not occur
within the period of the rule.'6
14Zeisweiss v. James, 63 Pa. 465; Witman v. Lex, 17 S & R 93.
'532 Pa. 434.
'6The senses of the word "perpetuities" are vaguely conceived and
discriminated in Shallcross' Estate; 20o Pa., 122; Richardson's Estate, 16
Phila. 326; Hillyards v. Miller, io Pa. 326; Yard's Appeal, 64 Pa.95; Stetson
v. Rosenberger, 196 Pa. 534; Turney's Estate, 2 Dist. 524; Smith's Estate,
181 Pa. io9; Cooper's Estate, 15o Pa. 576i Echternacht's Estate, 5 Dist. 298.
MOOT COURT.
ANDERSON vs. TITLE INSURANCE CO.
Interpretation of Contract of Insurance. leasure of damages.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Anderson had gone into a farm to which he had no right, and was not
disturbed in the possession.
At the end or four years, he applied to Defendant for an insurance of
his title for $8,ooo. He paid a premium of $zoo and the Company issued to
him a policy wherein it covenanted to indemnify and insure him, his heirs,
devisees or grantees to whom he transferred the policy with the Company's
consent against all loss to the extent of $8,ooo arising from defect of title.
He neither concealed nor misrepresented anything to the Company.
A year afterwards desiring to sell the land, one Jacobs said he would
pay $io,ooo for it, but, on discovering the state of title, refused longer to
negotiate. Anderson then brought assumpsit on policy claiming $8,ooo.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
EDWARDS, J.-By the act of May 9 th, 1889 P. L. x59, Title Insurance
Companies have "power and right to make insurance of every kind per-
taining to or connected with titles to real estate and to make, execute and
perfect such and so many contracts, agreements, policies and other instru-
ments as may be required therefor."
If Anderson had made, with the consent of the defendant company, a
contract that would not be declared void by Statute of Frauds, there is
possibly no doubt that he could have successfully maintained an action for
any actual loss he may have sustained.
Instead of making a contract, valid within Statute of Frauds, for the
sale of land, Jacobs said he would pay $io,ooo for it, but on investigating
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the title, he discovered that the plaintiff was not the real owner and so
Jacobs refused to negotiate any further.
To make a contract for the sale of land so the Statute of Frauds will
not operate against it; it must be in writing and signed by parties, Colton
v. Seldon, 5 Watts, 525, or there must be a parol contract with delivery of
possession, part payment of purchase money, and making of valuable im-
provements, Milliken v. Dravo, 67 Pa. 230; or there must be labor and valu-
able improvements that could not be compensated for in damages, McKowen
v. McDonald, 43 Pa. 441 or similar conditions that have been recognized as
sufficient to take it out of the.Statute.
In this case, we have only a naked offer of Jacobs, that he would pay a
certain price for the property.
There is no evidence of any loss except the loss of a prospective bar-
gain and that is not sufficient even to maintain an action against Jacobs for
loss of bargain, Meason v. Kaine, 67 Pa. 126.
The plaintiff had not according to the requirement of his policy secured
the consent of the defendant company to grant the land to Jacobs, neither
had he made a valid contract in keeping with the Statute of Frauds; so
under all circumstances of the case as presented in statement of facts, we
fail to see how lie can maintain an action of assumpsit on the policy.
We therefore give judgment for the defendant company.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
Wm. Anderson paid $200 to the defendant company, for its covenant to
insure him, his heirs and assigns "against all loss, to the extent of $8,ooo,
arising from defect of title."
It is not contended by the learned court below, that this contract is
voidable or void. No misrepresentation or concealment on the part of
Anderson, makes it voidable. It is not in excess of the power of the cor-
poration nor against public policy, for'the law under which the defendant is
organized contemplates the making of precisely such contracts.
Has the event occurred then, which entitles the plaintiff to the indem-
nity? The insurance is against all loss arising from defect of title. The title
meant, is a title in fee simple. The fee was worth, judging from Anderson's
willingness to sell it at that price, $io,ooo or thereabouts.
That his title is defective is clear.' It consists simply in an adverse
possession, which had, at the time of the obtaining of the policy, lasted
four years. It has since then, lasted a few years longer. Has Anderson
suffered any loss from the defectiveness of his title?
He had found Jacobs who was willing to pay him for a marketable fee
$io,ooo, but who, on investigating and finding the title defective, refused to
negotiate further. The learned court below has assumed that the only
loss Anderson has suffered, is the loss of his chance to obtain this Slo,ooo.
Satisfying itself that he had no contract with Jacobs which, save for the de-
fect of title, could have been enforced, it has concluded that he has lost
nothing. It is true that Anderson had acquired no right to receive from
Jacobs $Io,ooo.
Jacobs however had orally agreed to buy the land, and to pay $ioooo
for it. Was this contract void, as the learned court assumes? By no
means. The performance of it is obligatory on the vendee, and if he fails
to perform, he is compellable to pay damages; and the damages that he
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could be compelled to pay, are not nominal. They are the difference be-
tween the value of the land at the time of breach, and the price agreed to
be paid. See II Forum, p. 202. If the fee of the land was worth $8,ooo,
the damages would be $2,000. The defectiveness and unmarketability of
the title have made the recovery of these damages impossible. Surely
there has been, apparently, a loss. At least the plaintiff should have been
allowed to show that there had, and to recover what he should thus show.
We are of opinion moreover, that had there been no contract with any
one to sell this land, there would have been a loss in the sense of the policy.
The object of the insurance of the title, is not simply to protect against
actual loss, in future attempted sales, arising from the discovered defects
of the title, but loss from the actual inferiority of the title to that which
the assured is warranted to have. -'Loss." said Potter, J., "is a relative term.
Failure to keep that which one has, is loss." Foehrenbach v. Title & Trust
Co., 217 Pa. 331. The company virtually said, "You are in our judgment
the owner in fee of the entire interest in this property, and we will back
our opinion by agreeing to hold you harmless, up to the amount of the
policy, in case for any reason our judgment in this respect should prove to
be mistaken." Ibid. An object of the insurance is to secure to the assured
"relief of mind," as respects the soundness of the title.
Now it is true that Anderson still retains the possession, and in a sense,
therefore, still has all that he ever had. But, the insurance of title is not
a guaranty against loss of possession, by reason of the badness of title; or
against loss of the power to make profitable sales of the land, for that
reason. It'is a guaranty that the title is what it is warranted to be, and if
it is not, it obliges the insurer to pay, as damages, thet difference between
the alue of the land, the title to it being what it is warranted to be, and
the less value of it, the title being what it actually is. An indefeasible fee
in this land was, let us suppose, worth $ro,ooo. The actual title which
Anderson had exposed him to eviction at any time, by the real owner. It
was good, so long as he retained the possession, as against every other
person. It was possibly worth $zooo -or .$,,ooo. The loss is $9,ooo or
$8,ooo. Anderson paid $2oo to the defendant for its undertaking to pay
him as much as $8,ooo, if he should in fact not have an indefeasible title,
and if the value of the title he actually had was so much less than the value
of such indefeasible title.
It follows that the learned court below should have submitted to the
jury the question of the amount of damages suffered.
Judgment reversed with v.f. d. n.
JONATHAN STRIPE vs. WILLIAM ALLEN.
Death by wrongful act In another state. Suit therefor here. The
statute of limitations of another state.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Charles Stripe was killed in New Jersey by the wrongful act of Allen.
The plaintiff is, under the law of that state, entitled to damages. In that
state the suit must be begun in six (6) months from the death. Allen being
THE FORUM
found in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, the action was begun here
eleven (ii) months after the death. Allen demurs: (i) The action on the
New Jersey statute can not be maintained in Pennsylvania. (2) If it can
be here maintained, it was brought too late.
Mulhearn, for the plaintiff.
Ambrose, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
FALLER, J.-The first question which the demurer raises is, can this
action be maintained on the New Jersey statute in Pennsylvania? Assum-
ing, for the present, that the action is not barred by the New Jersey limita-
tion, we answer that it can. This question has been well settled for Penn-
sylvania in the case of Knight vs. West Jersey Railroad Co., io8 Pa. 25o.
The rule is, that when a'right of action has accrued in a foreign state by
common law or statutory law, the action, if it is of a transitory nature, may
be brought in Pennsylvania on the principle of comity, if the foreign law
does not conflict with the policy of the law of this state.
The question raised by the second point is, does the lex loci or the lex
fori govern as to the limitation of the time in which the action may be
brought? The Act of June 26th, 1895, P. L. 375, P- & L. Dig. Vol. 3, Supp.
p. 366, provides, "When a cause of action has been fully barred by the laws
of the state or country in which it arose, such bar shall be a complete de-
fense to an action in any 'of the courts of this Commonwealth."
We can locate no decision under this statute, and believe that its con-
stitutionality has never been decided. That it may be unconstitutional was
suggested by Sulzberger, J. in'the case of Dickerson vs. The Central R. R.
of N.J., 7 Pa. Dis. Rep. 104.
Under this Act the demurrer would be sustained, but we believe we
can obtain the same result without depending upon it, or deciding its con-
stitutionality. The Pennsylvania cases bearing on the point in question
are cases where the right of action accrued before the Act took effect, and
they have invariably held, that when a cause of action arises under the law
of another state, and the action is brought in this state, the remedy and
course of procedure are governed by the law of Pennsylvania. And statutes
of limitations are held to affect the remedy only, and not to extinguish the
cause af action. . Morgan vs. Camden & Atlantic R. R. Co., 2 Pa. C. C. 97.
Morgan vs. Newville, 24 P. F. Smith, 52; Watson vs. Brewster, i Pa. 381;
Bolton vs. Pennsylvania Company, 88 Pa. i61.
This is good law when -applied to ordinary statutes of limitation which
limit rights generally, or as a class, or a right of action arising under another
statute; but in the case before us the situation is different. Included in the
New Jersey statute on which the plaintiff's cause of action rests, there is a
limitation of the right, founded on a requirement that it be enforced within
a specified time. The statute first declares what the cause of action shall
be, then stipulates for whose benefit the action may be brought, and then
adds: "Provided, that every such action shall be commenced within "six"
calendar months after the death of such deceased." It is a right of action
'upon condition.' An action for recovery within six months is the exclusive
remedy. At the expiration of six months the cause of action, as well as the
liability of the defendant, is extinguished. The similar Pennsylvania
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statute does not have any extra territorial effect, and the plaintiff's case-
must stand or fall under the New Jersey statute. This case is the exception
to the general rule, which is as we have previonsly stated it. The rule for
the exception is, that a cause of action arising under a statute of a foreign
state, when that statute not only creates the cause of action but prescribes
certain exclusive remedies and also limits the time the liability will con-
tinue, in an action brought under it in this state, the lex loci must govern
as to the time in which the action must be brought. The defendant's
liability having been extinguished five months before this action was
brought, the plaintiff has nothing upon which to base his claim.
The demurrer is sustained.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
When a contract is made in New Jersey, its validity i&determined by
the law of that state. Its common law is as much its law, as is its stattlte
law, and it would be profoundly unphilosophical to, distinguish such obliga-
tions as spring from the former, from such as spring from the latter,
and to say that those of the former class may more readily be enforced
in Pennsylvania than those of .the latter class. When actions on New
Jersey contracts are brought in Pennsylvania we are not accustomed
to hear that it is simply the courtesy of the judges that, tolerates them, or
that allows them to-advance to judgment and execution. Our courti cheer-
fully, as if it were a matter of course, enforce, insuch actions both the New
Jersey common law and the New Jersey statute law, and nobody thinks
they have done anything exceptionally chivalrous or righteous.
Why should the attitude of the courts of Pennsylvania be different to-
wards causes of action arising in New Jersey, which are not contractual,
but tortious? The contract imposqs obligations, because the law of New
Jersey says it shall. The tort imposes obligations, because the law of New
Jersey says it shall. Some obligations founded on tort, like some founded
on contract, spring from its common-law, some from its statute law. There
is no more justification for a Pennsylvania court's refusing to enforce the
statute-created tort obligation, than for refusing.to enforce the common-law
tort obligation; none more, for refusing to enforce the New Jersey tort ob-
ligationthan the New Jersey contract obligation.
A court of common pleas of Philadelphia once thought it should not
entertain a suit based on a tort liability created by a New Jersey statute;
Knight v. Railroad Co., 13 W. N. C. 251: and even, Trunkey, J., reserved
a decision of the question as if there were something portentous in it, in
Patton v. P. C. Railway Co. 96 Pa. i59, Since that time, the hallucination
that there was really a new problem to wrestle with, has been dissipated,
and the courts of this state have frankly admitted to themselves that they
may and should enforce the obligations springing under- New Jersey law,
from )vrongfully caused deaths in that state. Knight v. West Jersey Rail.
road, ro8 Pa: z5o Usher v. Railroad Co. 126 Pa. 2o6; Cf. Phillips v. Library
Co..iv Pa. 462.-, -
, The law of New Jersey which creates theliability fdr a death resulting
from k wrongful act,- also prescribes that the action, to enforce it shall be
brought within six -munths following the death.- The present action was
begun:eleven months thereafter. The learned, court below has correctly
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said that the stafute of limitations of the state where the cause of action
occurred, will not, at common law, be enforced iji Pennsylvania; but only
the statute of this state. The common law has been superseded by the act
of June 26th, 1895, and the limitary period of the state in which the cause
of action occurred, must now be applied here. Of the validity of this
statute there can be no substantial doubt. The objections to it suggested
by Sultzberger, J., are as thin and light as gossamer, and may be dismissed
without anxiety.
Thq learned court below finding that the statute of New Jersey which
creates the liability, also qualifies it by making it endure for six months
only, unless an action for it is brought within that time, has held that this
limitation is inseparable from the obligation, and hence must be enforced
in Pennsylvania, even had the act of 1895 not been enacted, or were it un-
constitutional. This view has been adopted by learned courts "The limita-
tion prescribed by the law of the state where the injury occurred, governs
the time within which the action must be brought, regardless of where the
suit is tried, if the limitation is contained in the act creating the right of
action. But, where the statute giving the right of action in such state, pro-
vides no limitation, the limitation prescribed by the law of the forum will
govern." 8 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 886.
Judgment affirmed.
JAMES SLOAN vs. JOHN SLOAN, et. al.
Resulting Trust- from paying purchase money. Ejectment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
James Sloan negotiated a purchase of a house for $5,0oo from X. The
money was paid, and a deed made to Win. Sloan, father of James. Why
this was done does not appear. The father was very rich, while James
owned n6thing but the $5,ooo. A year later the father died. This is eject-
ment by James against tour brothers who claim to have taken four undivided
fifths by descent.
Replogle for plaintiff.
Prokopovitsh for defendant
OPINION OF THE COURT.
KOPYSCIANSKI, J. -The questions raised in the case at bar are: x.
If the same were a gift? 2. A resulting trust in favor of the son. To con-
stitute a gift there must be an intention expressed in words or acts, which
dogs not appear in this case. William's Appeal, io6 Pa. ix6; Scott vs.
Sanmon, 104 Pa. 593; Forum, Vol. 8, 158. When the purchase price is paid
by one person and the title is taken in the name of another person there is
a resulting trust in favor of the person paying the purchase money. Bispham'
Equity paie 13; Sourwine vs. Claypool, 138, Pa. 126. In Farrell vs. Lloyd,
69 Pa. 239, it appeared that the father purchased the land with the son's
money and even though the father in this case was a poor man, the court
held that there was a resulting trust in favor of the son. In the case at
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bar the son is poor only having $5,000 which he paid for the land and the
father is very rich. Relying upon the case just cited holding it good law,
it is much stronger ground to hold a resulting trust in favor of the son.
Bispham on Equity, 14o; Howell vs. Howell, 2 McCart, 75; Champlin vs.
Champlin, 136 Il1. 309. From the facts presented in the case, the court
holds that there is a resulting trust in favor of the son. Judgment for. the
plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
Whether William Sloan had the equitable as well as the legal title to
the land in question, depended on the intention with which James, his son,
procured the conveyance to him. He may have intended to give William
the land. He may have intended that William should hold it for him.
There is no explicit evidence concerning which of these intentions was the
actual one. What then shall we presume, in its absence7?
When one man pays for land, and directs that the deed shall name an-
other as grantee, it is inferred that the grantee was intended to be a trustee
for the buyer. This inference may be repelled, and that of a gift justified
and required by evidence of actual intention. Certain relationships in-
dicate that the intention was to give. If the procurer of the conveyance is
the father or mother of the grantee, the couits have inferred that he or she
intended the land to be an advancement or gift. The courts have justified
this inference, sometimes, by suggesting that the father or mother is under
a moral, and also a legal duty to support the child. This however is an
inadequate explanation. If the son or daughter is already worth one
million dollars, how can it be asserted that the father is under legal or
moral duty to increase this wealth by an advancement or gift? Yet, the
presumption would be made, even in such a case, that a gift was intended.
The question is one of intention, and intention is explained by motive. The
sense of duty would be, if it existed, a motive to give land to a son, but
there are other motives. Parental affection does things without any feel-
ing of constraint, without any thought of obligation. Fathers so often help
,sons or daughters, because of their affection for and pride in them, that re-
sort to a sense of duty to explain such gifts seems artificial and even
absurd.
If a parent is presumed to intend a gift, when he causes a conveyance
to be gratuitously made to a son, are we to say that when the son gratui-
tously causes a conveyance to his father, he is to be understood to have
the same intention? The courts, apparently do not so understand. "The
child," it is said, "is under no obligation to support its parents, and where
the purchase-money is paid by a son or daughter, and the purchase is made
in the name of his or her father or mother, the presumption in favor of a
resulting trust in favor of the child arises to the same extent as where the
purchase is made in the name of a stranger," 15 Am. & Eng. Encyc, zz64.
Startling as it is to be informed that a son is under no obligation to sup-
port his parents, no obligation moral or legal, a tenet which we are by no
means bound to accept, it seems to be true that in this case supposed, no
gift will be inferred, but a resulting trust. When a son purchases land,
paying the purchase money, and causing his father to be made grantee in
the deed, there is no presumption of a gift. Howell vs. Howell, x5 N.J.
Eq. 75. Said Williams, J., in Roberts vs. Remy, 56 Ohio 249, "While it is
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a familiar rule that a conveyance to a child of land purchased by the parent,
is presumed to be a gift or advancement, there is no presumption that a
gift is intended where a purchase is made with money belonging to a child,
and the legal title taken in the name of the parent. On the contrary in the
latter case, the presumption is that the title is so taken in trust for the
benefit of the child, and the burden is on the holder of the legal title to
overcome that presumption." Cf. Bispham, Eq. p. 140; 7 th edition.
Were the presumption that of a gift, we should be inclined to hold
that the additional facts revealed by the evidence, viz. that the father was
already very rich and that the son owned nothing except what he invested
in the purchase of the house, were sufficient to rebut it. What probability
is there that under such circumstances, the son would intend to give all he
had to his father, or that the father would consent to accept it? Cf. Mish-
ey's Appeal, 1o7 Pa. 6x i.
That one of two persons holding a certain relation to each other,
would be more apt to intend to give his property to the other, than the
other to him, is a principle valid not merely when applied to parent and
child, but when applied to husband and wife. A conveyance to a wife, pro-
cured by a husband, is understood to be a gift. But, when a wife procures
by her money, a conveyance to the husband, no gift is presumed. x5 Am.
& Eng. Encyc., 1158; Lloyd v. Woods, 176 Pa. 63.
That brothers are not presumed, when they cause conveyances to be
made to brothers, Edwards vs. Edwards, 39 Pa. 369, or to sisters, Warren
v. Steer, 112 Pa. 634, to intend a gift, is quite clear. It is possibly equally
certain that children, causing conveyances to be made to parents, are not
presumed to intend to make gifts. That the parents shall receive the land
for their, the children's benefit, is rather inferred to have been the intention.
The learned court below has properly decided that the land belongs to
James Sloan; and that no interest in it passed, at the death of William
Sloan to his heirs.
Judgment affirmed.
COMMONWEALTH v. ALLEN.
Larceny of Electricity.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Allen .attached a wire to the wires of the Carlisle Light and Power
Company and by means thereof he furnished his home with light for two
months. The Company had no knowledge of such attachment; and it was
Allen's intention to obtain the electricity without paying for it.
Gol&tein for Commonwealth.
Electricity like gas may be the subject of larceny. Comm. v. Shaw,
4 Allen 308.
Harrison for defendant.
There can be no larceny of electricity.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
BURGESS, J.-This is an indictment for the larceny of electricity.
The question to be decided is whether or not electricity may be the subject
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of larceny. There being no statute making it such, if larceny, it must be
so on common law principles. Larceny at common law is defined to be
the felonious taking and carrying away of the personal goods of another.
Such property only is the subject of larceny at common law as is properly
described as "goods and chattels." As soon as property is reduced into
the form of a chattel, and so long as it remains in that form, it may be
stolen.
A chattel is any article of movable good; and goods is defined as a
movable; wares; merchandise; commodities bought and sold'by merchants
and traders. Does electricity come within these definitions? We think it
does. The American and English Encyclopedia of Law, p. 514, says in
regard to electricity, "that there seems to be no doubt that electricity is not
the subject of larceny as goods and chattels within the common law defini-
tion, but because it is manufactured and sold, some jurisdictions have
made it the subject of larceny by statute," and cites a Utah Statute, but
no cases. We must disagree with this statement because we believe elec-
tricity to have all the requisite attributes of property. It is true that it
cannot be seen, and that scientists have not been able to satisfactorily
define it but can we say that it is not property because it will not excite
certain of our senses; or that because of our lack of knowledge of its
nature we can not call it property?
In Commonwealth vs. Shaw, 14 Allen 308, Chief Justice Bigelow says
in regard to illuminating gas, that had been stolen, "It is a valuable article
of merchandise, bought and sold like other personal property, susceptible
of being severed from a mass or larger quantity, and of being transported
from place to place." Every one of these tests given by Justice Bigelow
applies exactly to electricity. Gas feloniously drawn from a pipe through
which it is transmitted, in Commonwealth vs. Shaw, supra, or water in the
same condition, in Ferens vs. O'Brien, ii Q. B. D. 21, C. 238, have been
held to be larceny. And we fail to see, insofar as usefulness is concerned,
and in reason, why electricity should be any the less the subject of
larceny.
Electricity is manufactured, stored, transported in storage batteries,
transmitted along wires, measured, owned, bought, sold, and if we are not
in error, stolen.
It is contended by the defendant that electricity is simply a condition,
such as heat or cold. This may be true. It may be that to the scientist
and particularly to the physicist, electricity is only a condition, and is only
important as such, but to the lawyer, and for all business purposes it is a
commodity that is the subject of commercial transaction, the same as any
other personal property. One may not be able to discover the elements of
which it consists, but this does not make it any the less valuable commer-
cially, or place it without the definition of "goods and chattels."
Having decided that electricity is property it remains to be shown that
the nature of the taking by Allen constituted larceny. The taking and
carrying away are felonious, where the goods are taken against the will of
the owner, either in his absence or in a clandestine manner, or where pos-
session is obtained either by force or surprise, or by any trick, device or
fraudulent expedient, the owner not voluntarily parting with his entire
interest in the goods, and when the taker intends, in any such case, fraudu-
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lently to deprive the owner of his entire interest in the property, against
his will. According to the statement of facts Allen had been taking this
electricity and lighting his house with it for two months, without the knowl-
edge of the Light & Power Co., and with an intention not to pay for it. This
being the case, according to the -principles stated it was a felonious taking.
He is therefore guilty of larceny.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The question presented for review by this court is not whether the
taking (if such it may be called) of electricity under the circumstances in
this case constitute a common law crime, lut whether it constitutes the
common law crime of larceny. If the former question were addressed to
us, we should derive much comfort from the doctrine of Comm. v. McHale,
97 Pa. -St. 397, approved and followed in Comm. v. Randolph 146 Pa. St. 83.
In the determination of the latter question it behooved us to have a care
lest in endeavoring to protect the "public economy" we should yield to the
temptations of expediency and do violence to well settled legal definitions
and principles.
Accordingly, we have decided that the judgment of the learned court
below must be reversed. In the opinion of this court to constitute the crime
of larceny there must be a taking possession of some material substance;
some portion of matter which can be separated bodily from the-place where
it has been and transported into another.
Lexicographers and judges may differ as to the exact meaning of the
term "goods and chattels," but we think it will be universally conceded that
these terms have never been understood to include anything which was not
recognized as a material substance of some kind.
We have been unable to find any scientific writer of recognized authority
who would assume, the responsibility of declaring that electricity is a
material substance. Electricity has been defined as a "cause" (Century
Dictionary, 15oCyc. 467) a "force" (Bouvier's Dictionary) and as an
"agent" (Standard Dictionary) but as a general rule, the writers upon the
subject frankly admit that to the question; "What is electricity," it is
impossible to give an answer. (Caillard on Electricity 289, Walmsley on
the Electric Current, 2o; Trowbridge on "What is Electricity," 305; Tunzel-
man on Electricity. 5.)
If we were disposed to adopt a method of reasoning analogous to that
of the learned court below we might, at this point, decide that because we
do not know that elec'tricity is not matter, therefore it is matter, therefore
it is larceny to take it. We should regret, however, to see this method of
reasoning adopted in criminal cases. This negative process is hardly con-
sistent with certain well settled principles of the common law of crimes.
As a matter of fact. there is abundant authority for the proposition that
electricity .is not matter, and that no material substance is carried from
place to place by the current. Silvanus Thompson, a Fellow of the Royal
Society in a recent publication says, "Electricity is the name given to an
invisible agent known to us only by the effects which it produces and by
various manifestations called electrical. These manifestations, at first
obscure and mysterious, are now well understood, though little is known of
the precise nature of electricity itself. It is not matter." (Thompson on
Electricity.) The theory that electricity is a fluid, formerly held by a few
scientists is now universally repudiated. Caillard on Electricity, 289; Trow-
bridge on "What is Electricity, 305, 15 Cyc. 467.
THE FORUM
A noted writer on criminal law, perhaps the greatest present day
authority on the subject, in a recent contribution to the legal literature of
the criminal law says, "At common law the only subjects of larceny were
tangible, movable chattels; something which could be taken in possession
and carried away and which had some, although trifling, intrinsic value.
Anything which has length, breadth and thickness, whether it is a solid, a
liquid or a gas, provided it is the subject of private ownership, may be the
subject of larceny." J. H. Beale, Jr-, in 25 Cyc. 12. We do not believe
that the author of this article would consider electricity a tangible, movable
chattel, or that it is something which has length, breadth and thickness.
The most that is known of electricity is that it is a "power," or a "force."
The stealing of power is not larceny. If A should take the horse of B
without his consent, for the purpose of hauling a load of coal to Newville,
but with the intent to return the horse upon the completion of the journey,
he would not be guilty of larceny. Rex v. Phillips, 2 East P. C. 662. Rex
v. Crump, i Car, and P. 658, Beales Cas., 685. Com. v. Wilson, 2 Phila.
Yet, during the time which A has the horse he has deprived B of its power,
and that power can never be returned. If A should carry a tub of ice into
the dry room of B's lumber mill and allow it to remain there until it melted
and then remove the water, he would deprive B of a large amount of heat,
but it will scarcely be claimed that he would be guilty of larceny.
The learned court below has placed great reliance upon Com. v. Shaw
14 Allen 308. In that case, speaking of gas, Chief Justice Bigelow said,
"It is a valuable article of merchandise, bought and sold like other per
sonal property, etc." We do not think that the present case comes within
the terms of that ofiinion. Bigelow, C. J., did not say that because gas
was bought and sold, etc., therefore it was a valuable article of merchan-
dise. Everything that-is bought and sold is not merchandise. Real prop-
erty, ships, money, stocks and bonds are not merchandise. tCentury Dic-
tionary) Moreover nothing is said about merchandise in the common law
definition of larceny. But conceding that the learned court below has
brought this case within the terms of that ofiinion in Com. v. Shaw, he has
not brought it within the brincifile of the decision. That case simply de-
cided that gas is the subject of larceny. The nature of illuminating gas is
well understood. It is a substance possessing perfect molecular mobility
and is recognized as a form of matter. (Century Dictionary, Standard
Dictionary.) The case can not therefore be cited as an authority for the
proposition that something which is not matter may be the subject of lar-
ceny. Even the authorities; which claim that nothing which has not three
dimensions may be the subject of larceny, concede that gas may be the
subject of larceny.
The mind of the scientist is far reaching and loves to form hypotheses
and theories and perhaps no subject is so susceptible to theorization as
electricity; but so far as this court knows no scientist claims that electricity
is matter. It would therefore be impertinent, indeed, for this court as mere
men or lawyers to attempt to establish a theory which scientists not only do
not affirm but which they deny. While it is true that mere men, when
clothed with the judicial ermine become immune to charges of impertinence,
ignorance and injustice, we do not care to place ourselves in such a position
as to render it necessary to avail ourselves of this undeserved immunity.
The means of inflicting injuries are as infinite as the variety of human
ingenuity and the malicious ingenuity of mankind is constantly busied in
producing new inventions in the art of disturbing their neighbors and it,
is the object of the common law to adapt itself to the new devices of man
kind to injure society and punish them as they arise. This object has not,
however, been accomplished by expanding the definitions of tle common
law felonies but by establishing new species of offenses.
The courts of this commonwealth have manifested no inclination to
extend the limits of the common law-crime of larceny. Wallis v. Mease, 3
Binn. 546. Findlay v. Bear, 8 S. & R. Com. v. Boyer, 3 P- C. C. 234.
Lewis v. Com. 15 S. & R. 93- Com. v. Barrett. 28 Sup. 12.
In Warner v. Com. r Pa. St. 154, the Supreme Court decided that
"county orders" were not the subject of larceny, though there was in force
at that time a statute making obligations bonds, bills of exchange and
promissory notes the subject of larceny.
We do not think it will be a serious repedation to declare that electricity
is not the subject of larceny.
